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CHARLES N. BROWER*

The Great War Powers Debatet
In 1972 the United States Senate passed the Javits war powers bill by
the overwhelming majority of 68 to 16. Although it then died in conference, it has been reintroduced this year in identical form as S. 440 with 60
sponsors, and it is once more the subject of Congressional hearings, editorials and public debate.
It permits the President, in the absence of a declaration of war or other
explicit congressional authorization, to introduce armed forces into hostilities or potentially hostile situations only to repel an attack against the
United States, its territories, possessions, or armed forces abroad; to
forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack; to retaliate, but
only in response to an attack on the United States, its territories or
possessions, and not in response to an attack on our armed forces abroad;
and to protect citizens and nationals of the United States abroad, but only
while evacuating them.
Even these narrowly defined authorities terminate after thirty days unless Congress is physically unable to meet because of an attack on the
United States, or unless, and only so long as, continued hostilities are
necessary to a prompt disengagement of American forces.
The real import of the Javits bill is perhaps best understood if one
studies its possible application in a hypothetical crisis. Suppose, for example, that signals are being received at the National Military Command
Center at the Pentagon which indicate that United States missile firing
submarines at sea around the world, the mainstay of the strategic deterrent
force, are being destroyed one by one in rapid succession by the localized
attacks of an identified hostile power.
Hostile forces thus are swiftly eliminating the ability of the United
States ever to launch a damaging second strike, leaving it defenseless and
hence in a state of acute political vulnerability. The President of the United
States, solemnly sworn "to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution
of the United States," is advised by the Attorney General that the War
Powers Act (Javits bill) makes it uncertain whether he has legal authority
to take the necessary and appropriate retaliatory actions to meet the
*Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State.
tBased on an address delivered in Washington, D.C. on April 14, 1973 before meeting of
the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association.
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obvious threat, inasmuch as the hostile attack is being made against armed
forces of the United States located abroad rather than against the United
States itself, its territories or possessions. He adds that a retaliatory strike
by American bombers, land based missiles and remaining submarine missile forces, which must take place soon, if ever, should be authorized by
Congress, which is not in session.
Another hypothetical case illustrates a somewhat different danger of this
bill. Assume that hostile units have surrounded American forces garrisoning a friendly foreign city the United States has pledged to defend and have
cut off all outside access without a shot being fired. The leaders of these
forces have expressly stated in public broadcasts that they have no intention of launching an attack on the city or on any Allied forces located
there.
They have made it equally clear, however, that they will not permil
appropriate provisioning of the city or of American forces, and that they
will fire on the first American soldier who moves to break the blockade.
Because there has been no attack and there exists no direct and immineni
threat of an attack on American territory or forces, the President is advised
that he is precluded by the War Powers Act (Javits bill) from initiating
military movements which could result in hostilities.
The matter is therefore quickly submitted to Congress, which is ir
session. The House of Representatives, after a limited debate affording one
hour to each side, approves a broad range of Presidential actions whict
may be taken to relieve the siege by the overwhelming vote of 397 to 38.
In the Senate, however, a numerically small but vigorous oppositior
causes the measure to be considered for the full five days permitted by the
War Powers Act (Javits bill) and as hope for a quick American respons
fades the confidence of the city population wanes. The international crisi,
deepens as a result of the visible inability of the American President ever
to provide for the welfare of his own troops.
In the above hypothetical situation, even if the War Powers Act pro.
vided only that Congress could by majority vote of either House bring
halt to Presidential action, rather than precluding it in the first place, ver3
serious difficulties would be presented. For example, if the President act!
quickly to meet the threat to the city, localized hostilities might well ensue.
A resolution introduced in the House to terminate such action is soundl3
defeated, by the same lopsided vote of 397 to 38. However, quiet diplomat
ic efforts to relieve the crisis have dissolved in the heat of publicit,
surrounding the congressional debate and hopes for peace dim. The Senato
then votes 51 to 49 to require the President to terminate hostilities. Thi
result is an abject and unseemly withdrawl and the submission of the cit,
to loss of its freedom.
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The number of examples such as these which can be hypothesized is
virtually endless. By any rational yardstick they are at least moderately
disturbing. The existence of such a political and military crisis is itself a
major threat; to be hamstrung in dealing with it in the manner contemplated
by the war powers legislation, and the Javits bill in particular, could nurture
a crisis into a catastrophe.
The war powers bills rest largely on several fundamental misconceptions. The first of these is that the United States should not become
involved in hostilities of any kind, particularly in protracted ones, except
on the basis of a declaration of war. This assumption is fundamental to
almost all of the proposals for war powers legislation. The first sentence of
the Javits bill commences: "In the absence of a declaration of war by
Congress..."
A declaration of war, however, essentially amounts to an official statement by one country that a state of war exists between it and another
country. It gives rise to well-defined rights and consequences under international law, and automatically invokes a wide array of emergency
authorities under our domestic legislation. This is a step which has been
taken by the Congress only five times in nearly 200 years.' All but one
declaration of war by the United States has provided that "all the resources of the country are ...pledged by the Congress of the United

2
States" to "carry on war against the foreign government involved.
In the twentieth century declarations of war have taken on an implication of dedication to the destruction of the enemy. This implication would
in many cases be incompatible with the limitations on use of force contained in the United Nations Charter and in fact declarations of war have been
extremely rare in the world in recent decades. Surely Congress does not
desire to promote maximum retaliation in every case where a less extreme
form of military action by the United States would be appropriate.
In truth a curious footnote to history exists in the fact that on April 11,
1972 the United States Senate by a tally of 78 to 7 (with 15 not voting)
voted to table a declaration of war against the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam which had been proposed as an amendment to the Javits war
powers bill.
Congress in fact would be unduly limiting its role in military and foreign
affairs were it to restrict itself to the power to declare war. From the legal
perspective a declaration of war is just like any other act or resolution of
'War of 1812-June 18. 1812; 2 Stat. 755 Mexican-American War-May 13, 1846; 9
Stat. 9 Spanish-American War-April 25, 1898; 30 Stat. 364 World War 1-April 6, 1917; 40
Stat. I World War I1- December 8, 1941; 55 Stat. 788.
2Mexican- American War- May 13, 1846; 9 Stat. 9.
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Congress. The power to declare war is one of the legislative powers
enumerated in Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution.
Declarations of war, like all other acts of Congress, are subject to the
provisions of Article 1, section 7 of the Constitution, stating that every bill,
order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of both Houses of
Congress may be necessary shall be approved either by the President or by
a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress overriding a veto. Thus,
once war is declared, it cannot constitutionally be undeclared by a vote of
less than two-thirds of both Houses unless the President concurs.
Congress has greater flexibility under the general powers of authorization and appropriation, which ordinarily are exercised on an annual
basis and, insofar as support of military forces is concerned, constitutionally cannot be exercised less frequently than every two years.
Under these powers recurrent positive action by Congress is necessary if
the President is to have at his disposal the necessary military instruments
for application of his policy.
The advocates of legislation like that proposed by Senator Javits appear
to have realized the inherent limitations of reliance on declarations of war,
and have actually shifted ground during the course of debate. More
recently they have characterized the war powers bill as an attempt to refine
implementation of the other constitutional war powers of Congress and the
President under the authority of the "necessary and proper" clause.
However, the proponents of this legislation, in attempting to implement
the respective war powers of Congress and the President, actually have
exceeded the bounds of implementation and have transgressed directly on
the underlying constitutional powers.
For example, the Javits bill purports to restrict the President's power to
defend even the continental United States by limiting to thirty days the
period in which he may engage in hostilities, unless Congress specifically
authorizes an extension or is physically unable to meet because of an
attack on the United States. Under the Constitution even the states have
authority to provide for their own defense when they are actually invaded
or are in imminent danger of invasion (Article 1, section 10).
Surely the President can have no less authority than the constituent
states of the Union. Indeed, the Federal Government has an unlimited
constitutional obligation and authority to defend the states (Article 4,
section 4), and the President as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
is the officer bearing the responsibility and possessing the authority to
ensure that defense. There can hardly be serious doubt but that the limitation on continental defense envisaged by the Javits bill cannot properly be
imposed other than by means of a constitutional amendment.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 7, No. 4
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At least one member of the Senate, Senator Inouye, in a speech before
the Convention of the National Order of Women Legislators on November
13, 1972,3 suggested that it would be necessary to convoke the constitutional convention to consider a revision of the constitutional scheme of
war powers.
The "necessary and proper" clause does not constitute an independent
grant of constitutional authority enabling Congress to redefine or reallocate
the various constitutionally prescribed war powers. Hamilton made quite
clear in the Federalist that the "necessary and proper" clause was not
intended to limit the principle of the separation of powers, but rather to
preclude too narrow a construction of the authority of the Union vis-a-vis
that of the individual states.
The Supreme Court in Myers, v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52 (1926), substantiated
this fundamental precept in ruling that Congress could not constitutionally
condition the President's removal power on the concurrence of the Senate.
The "necessary and proper" clause does not itself support any legislation
which is in conflict with another provision of the Constitution or otherwise
violates the separation of powers.
Clearly there are those who would support a constitutional amendment
along the lines of the Javits bill, but this would constitute rejection of
nearly 200 years of proven constitutional tradition. The Founding Fathers
showed great vision in describing and allocating the war powers in general
terms, recognizing that it is impossible reliably to foresee and forecast the
precise remedy for every conceivable crisis of future ages.
The proposal to change the United States Constitution in this fundamental way reflects the mistaken belief that detailed rules of procedure will
necessarily produce correct foreign policy decisions, that legal formalism
will ensure wisdom. Flaws in foreign policy are not, however, compelled
by the American constitutional structure; nor would they be avoided by its
remodeling. They lie instead in the unavoidable imperfection of human
decision-making, which in turn arises from the fact that no one is omniscient.
The ultimate misconception of war powers legislation is the belief, contrary to the Shakespearean incantation, that the fault is in our stars and not
in ourselves. It is the belief that where men have gone wrong, governmental systems necessarily must be at fault. Perhaps this is understandable
in context. No great war has been fought by this country without some
attempt to ascertain who and what it was that placed us in such a predicament in the first place.
36
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The impulse to inquisition is more intense when the war has not gone
well. Perhaps it is too much to expect that Congress should register the
thought that is was itself deficient in wisdom to any degree. This is not to
suggest that the motivation for war powers legislation is essentially political
or peculiarly partisan. It is to acknowledge the existence of a rather
predictable manifestation of human nature.
The participants in this great debate over war powers must realize that
to the extent they may object to what transpired in Viet-Nam their quarrel
is not with the constitutional allocation of war powers, but rather with the
respective execution of those powers, and the fundamental institutions
whose collective responsibility is the creation of whatever wisdom mortals
are able to achieve.
The respective advocates can do justice to this great debate about the
Constitution only if the misconceptions noted above are abandoned. This
debate fundamentally requires broad reflection on how the national capacity of the United States to devise wise international policy can be enhanced, rather than concentration on means by which policy responses can
be inhibited.
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